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Abstract 
 
This study investigates loan price and quantity effects of information sharing offices with 
ICT, in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 2001-2011.The 
empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and Instrumental Quantile 
Regressions. Our findings broadly show that ICT with public credit registries decrease the 
price of loans and increase the quantity of loans.  While the net effects from the interaction of 
ICT with private credit bureaus do not lead to enhanced financial access, corresponding 
marginal effects show that ICT can complement private credit bureaus to increase loan 
quantity and decrease loan prices when certain thresholds of ICT are attained. We compute 
and discuss the ICT thresholds that are required to make this possible.  
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1. Introduction  
There have been very few papers that study information sharing for financial access. In 
particular, we are interested in studying the gains that can be made from information sharing 
for financial access in the context of Africa, where investments are increasingly needed in 
order for the continent to evolve and develop. When compared to the rest of the world, the 
African continent has more room for information and communication technology (henceforth 
ICT) penetration. Moreover, there are growing concerns that there is excess liquidity in 
African banking institutions and issues of information asymmetry in the financial sector. A 
substantial bulk of the current literature on African business accords on the imperative for 
more sources of investment because, for the most part, privatisation and liberalization projects 
initiated over the past decades have failed to generate the much needed external finance (see 
Tuomi, 2011; Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Darley, 2012; Bartels et al., 2009).  
  Additionally, as documented by Penard et al. (2012), there is substantial room for 
improving the penetration of ICT in Africa because ICT growth is stabilizing, as seen in the 
high-end economies of North America, Europe and Asia. Moreover, according to the authors, 
there is an uneven penetration in mobile phones and the internet across the continent. For 
instance, as of 2010, whereas developed countries were experiencing saturation points in 
mobile phone and internet penetrations, corresponding penetration rates in Africa were 
respectively 41% and 9.6%. It follows that there is great potential for the leveraging of ICT, 
especially for development outcomes.  
 The concerns of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (see Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70) are traceable to information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers. In this light, policies conducive to the establishment of information 
sharing offices have been founded on the need to address the surplus liquidity issues as well 
as a plethora of factors that are endogenous to increasing information asymmetry, namely: 
physical access, affordability and eligibility to lending from banks (Allen et al., 2011; Batuo 
& Kupukile, 2010).  
 Studies on information sharing offices have for the most part been positioned on 
developed countries which, compared to less developed countries, have fewer financial access 
issues. Accordingly, a substantial chunk of existing literature has focused on countries in the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Latin America and Asia. 
Unfortunately, Africa which is facing more severe concerns in financial access has received 
less scholarly attention in contrast (Asongu et al., 2016a). To put things in perspective, no 
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African country had been studied by Galindo and Miller (2001).  Love and Mylenko (2003) 
considered a group of four African countries and were followed by Barth et al. (2009) who 
covered nine countries.  
The study by Triki and Gajigo (2014), is closest to the  positioning of our inquiry. They use 
Probit models to assess 42 African countries for the 2006 to 2009 period. The present inquiry 
is distinct from Triki and Gajigo (2014) in three main perspectives: data, methodology and 
policy. In particular, we make use of a larger and more comprehensive dataset of countries for 
the period 2001-2011.  We use Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Instrumental 
Variable Quantile Regressions (IV QR) in order to address concerns of endogeneity.  
While, Triki and Gajigo (2014) have investigated the relationship between credit registries 
and financial access at the conditional means of access to finance, we believe that it is also 
important to investigate the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of access to 
finance in order to articulate financial institutions with low, intermediate and high levels of 
financial access. The policy relevance of this modelling approach is that blanket cross-country 
policies designed to improve financial access by means of information sharing offices may 
not be effective unless they are contingent on existing levels of financial access and tailored 
differently across financial institutions with different characteristics of financial access.  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) acknowledge the failure to account for endogeneity as a caveat of 
their inquiry.  Specifications in the present inquiry are tailored to address the concern of 
endogeneity by controlling for: (i) time invariant omitted variables and simultaneity with the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach and (ii) simultaneity and the unobserved 
heterogeneity with an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (IVQR) approach.   
Additionally, in our study ICT-related policy variables are integrated into the modelling 
exercise in order to examine how internet and mobile phone penetrations complement 
information sharing offices in decreasing information asymmetry for enhanced financial 
access, in terms of increased quantity of loans and reduced price of loans
1
.  
 Overall, assessing loan and price effects of reducing information asymmetry with ICT 
is of policy interest, because the findings would inform policy makers on complementary 
instruments to information sharing offices that can be employed to boost access to finance in 
order to enable poor households and small businesses capitalise on mobilised savings to 
increase economic consumption, investment and productivity which ultimately culminate in 
reduced unemployment and higher economic growth.  
                                                          
1
 Throughout the study, the term financial access is used interchangeably with ‘loan quantity’ and/or ‘loan price’.  
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The stylized facts, background and 
theoretical underpinnings can be found in Section 2. Section 3 covers the data and 
methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes and provides future research directions.  
 
2. Stylized facts, background and theoretical underpinnings  
2.1 Stylized facts and background  
 Less than 20% of African households have access to formal financial services (IFAD, 
2011). The stylized facts maintain that the main factors limiting financial access include: poor 
transport facilities, low population densities and limited communication infrastructure. 
According to the narrative, even in regions with comparatively higher rates of financial 
services, some households and small corporations may still be faced with constraints in 
lending requirements like strict documentation and collaterals. Moreover, in cases where the 
underlying requirements in lending are fulfilled, financial access could still be limited by high 
costs (e.g. transaction fees) and considerable minimum saving requirements.  
 Credit reference offices are institutions that are designed to collect information on the 
debt of borrowers (both individual and commercial) from many sources. These include: retail 
lenders, bank and credit card corporations (mostly for individuals) and public sources 
(Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016). Once the data is collected, it is cross-checked for a 
comprehensive report and consolidated. Such data from credit histories can encompass both 
positive and negative data. Positive information consists of credit histories on attitudes 
towards repayment while negative information overwhelmingly consists of default data.  
 According to Mylenko (2008), prior to the year 2008, information sharing offices were 
solidly established for the most part in Asia, Latin America, European and North American 
countries. However, the global financial crisis and growing ICT, prompted the institution of 
credit reference agencies across Africa. In essence, before 2008, with the exception of South 
Africa, not many African countries had well-functioning credit reference bureaus. In addition, 
the mission of such information sharing offices was substantially restricted to banking sector 
supervision. Hence, the price of loans remained high for two main reasons. On the one hand 
the incapacity of credit agencies to provide timely and accurate information on borrowers’ 
history. On the other hand the absence of relevant technology and incentives.  This latter point 
articulates the complementary role of ICT in facilitating the role of information sharing 
services on financial access.  
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2.2 Theoretical highlights  
  
 Two principal views exist in the literature on the theoretical connection between credit 
reference agencies and access to finance (see Claus & Grimes, 2003). The first perspective is 
oriented towards bank liquidity provisions, whereas the second considers the capacity of 
financial institutions to enhance assets’ risk characteristics. Both views however are founded 
on the main goal of financial intermediation. This goal is to enhance financial intermediation 
efficiency by transforming mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. The 
theoretical foundations of the linkage between information sharing offices and improved 
financial intermediation are substantiated by the imperfect market information literature. The 
principal role of information sharing offices in financial intermediation is to reduce costs in 
information and transactions, that are the result of information asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowers in the banking industry.  
 In the light of the above, the relationship between financial access and information 
sharing offices, faces two problems: moral hazard from borrowers and adverse selection from 
lenders.  On the one hand, information sharing offices reduce adverse selection in banks by 
providing them with a comprehensive picture of the credit history of borrowers. Consolidated 
knowledge on information from borrowers reduces incremental interest rates that would have 
been levelled by financial institutions in order to compensate for the adverse selection. On the 
other hand, once loans have been granted to borrowers, they are liable of moral hazard: a 
behaviour that consists of concealing activities to which the loan is granted with the ultimate 
aim of avoiding and/or limiting compliance with their financial obligations.  
Credit bureaus are also responsible for informing the borrowers on the perils of defaulting on 
their debts, especially on unsustainability of debt defaults because the informal financial 
sector is considered as a viable alternative to the formal banking sector. Information sharing 
offices can thus reduce a borrower’s moral hazard by playing a role in market discipline.  
In summary: information sharing offices mitigate adverse selection ex-ante of lending while 
they also reduce moral hazard, ex-post of lending. By conception and definition, the mission 
of information sharing offices is facilitated by ICT.  
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3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
We examine of panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries
2
, with data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and Bankscope, for the period 2001-2011. The periodicity, choice of 
countries and number banks are constrained by data availability. In essence, information on 
credit bureaus from the World Bank Development indicators is only available from 2001. In 
accordance with Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), dependent variables for ‘loan price’ and 
‘loan quantity’ are respectively the ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘logarithms of loans’.  
 Consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices are measured 
with public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Internet penetration and mobile phone 
penetration are used to measure ICT. Market-oriented features (GDP per capita growth, 
inflation and population density), bank-related characteristics (Deposits/Assets and Bank 
branches) and dummy variables for the unobserved heterogeneity are used as control 
indicators. The dummies include bank: ownership (foreign versus vs. domestic), size (large 
vs. small) and ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  
 In line with economic theory, we expect the following signs with regard to bank-
oriented features. We expect the ‘deposit to asset ratio’ should increase both the quantity and 
price of loans. This is because in essence, deposits are the principal source of bank financing. 
A higher proportion of deposits in liquid liabilities can increase loan quantity and/or interest 
rate margins, since good organisation is necessary for effectiveness in mobilisation and 
adequate management. Intuitively, while the number of bank branches should positively affect 
loan quantity, it should also negatively influence the price of loans.  
 With regards to market-related features, the following signs are expected. From 
intuition, GDP per capita (which is included to account for business cycle fluctuations) is 
expected to influence the quantity of loans positively. Conversely, the anticipated sign for 
loan price is ambiguous because it is contingent on market dynamism and expansion. 
However, if GDP per capita is decreasing over time, it can affect both loan quantity and loan 
price as a result of decreasing demand. We anticipate negative signs because the population 
on average across Africa has been growing at a faster rate than GDP, leading to a decreasing 
GDP per capita for this period (Asongu, 2013a).  
Population density is anticipated to influence both the price and quantity of loans positively. 
This is because increasing demand for loans, owing to high density in population, increases 
                                                          
2
 The list of countries we are studying is available in Appendix 5.  
8 
 
loan price. Moreover, we anticipate inflation to decrease the quantity of loans and increase the 
price of loans. This is essentially because investors prefer to invest in economic environments 
that are less ambiguous (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016). In essence, 
given that less investment (and hence quantity) of loans are apparent during economic 
uncertainty (e.g. high inflation), loan price is anticipated to increase with inflation uncertainty 
because the interest rates levelled on loans are usually adjusted for inflation.  
 In contrast, establishing anticipated signs for dummy variables is difficult. For 
example both small and big banks (for bank size heterogeneity) can be associated with 
positive and negative effects resulting from loan dynamics, though big banks are 
comparatively more associated with management and coordination issues linked to bank size. 
Furthermore, addressing the challenges that come with increasing bank size is also a cause of 
inefficiency, owing to issues encountered with resolving conflicts related to customer needs 
and requirements. In the same vein, the incidence of foreign versus domestic banks 
(ownership heterogeneity) and Islamic versus non-Islamic banks (compliance with Sharia 
finance) depends on a multitude of features, which include: market dynamism and expansion 
as well as staffs’ organisational capabilities.  
 Appendix 1 summarizes the expected signs of the control variables and Appendix 2 
provides the definitions and source of variables employed in the study. Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 respectively present the summary statistics and correlation matrix.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Generalised methods of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
 The GMM empirical approach is adopted by this inquiry for five principal reasons. 
While the first-two are basic requirements for using the estimation strategy, the last-three are 
advantages that are associated with the choice of the empirical approach.  
(1) The empirical approach takes into account persistence in loan quantity and price given that 
the criterion or rule of thumb to ascertain persistence in the two dependent variables is met. In 
essence, the correlation between loan price and loan quantity and their first lags are 
respectively 0.845 and 0.996, which are above the 0.800 rule of thumb.  
(2) The N (or 162)>T(or 11) criterion needed for a GMM technique is also met given that the 
number of time series in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections.  
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(3) Endogeneity is accounted for in all regressors by the estimation technique because 
instrumental variables are employed for suspected endogenous regressors. Moreover, the use 
of time-invariant omitted variables also enables some bite on endogeneity.  
(4) Biases in the difference estimator are addressed with the system estimator.  
(5) Cross-country variations are incorporated into the specifications.  
 As shown by Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator  used by Arellano & 
Bond (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) has better estimation properties than the difference 
estimator used in Arellano & Bond (1991). This inquiry adopts an extension by Roodman 
(2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of 
first differences because the empirical strategy has been documented by Baltagi (2008) and 
Love and Zicchino (2006) to restrict over-identification or limit instrument proliferation. In 
the specification, a two-step approach is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure for loan quantity.  
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Where: tiLQ ,  
is the loan quantity of bank i
 
at  period t ; ISO  is an information sharing office 
(PCR (Private Credit Registries) or PCB (Public Credit Bureaus)); 0  
is a constant;
 
 is the 
degree of auto-regression; W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP per capita growth, 
Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets  and Bank Branches),
 i

 
is the country-specific 
effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. Dummy variables are not 
included in the GMM specifications because fixed effects are eliminated.   Equations (1) and 
(2) are replicated when the dependent variable is loan price. 
 As concerns exclusion restrictions and identification, all explanatory variables are 
considered as suspected endogenous or predetermined variables whereas only years are 
acknowledged to be strictly exogenous (this is consistent with Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), essentially because it is not likely for years to become 
endogenous in first difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, the procedure for treating 
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ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is used for suspected 
endogeneous variables.  
 With the above background, the strictly exogenous instruments or years influence the 
outcome variables exclusively through the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. 
Furthermore, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference 
in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity.  Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this test 
should not be rejected for the instruments to elucidate loan quantity and loan price exclusively 
via the predetermined variables. Hence, whereas in the standard instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation technique, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that instruments do not elicit the outcome variable 
beyond the endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), in 
the GMM approach which employs forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion 
employed to investigate if years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT.  Therefore, in the 
findings that are reported in Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is validated if the 
alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is  rejected. 
 
3.2.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 In order to account for existing levels of loan price and loan quantity, the current study 
employs the Quantile Regressions (QR) technique. This technique is consistent with the 
literature on conditional determinants (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; 
Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b). The approach consists of assessing the nexus 
between information sharing offices and the outcome variables throughout the conditional 
distributions of loan price and quantity, with particular emphasis on banks with low, 
intermediate and high levels of financial access.  
 The existing literature on information sharing has been oriented towards the 
conditional mean of financial access (see Asongu et al., 2016b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014).  While 
mean impacts are relevant, the underlying literature is extended with an estimation approach 
that controls for existing levels of loan price and quantity. In addition, studies that use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to emphasise mean effects are based on the assumption that 
error terms are normally distributed. However, with QR, the hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors does not hold. In addition, the QR is robust to presence of outliers because 
parameters are estimated at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
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 The concern about endogeneity is addressed by using an Instrumental Variable QR 
(IVQR) procedure. The instrumentation procedures for an information sharing office (e.g. 
private credit bureaus) and an ICT indicator (e.g. Internet penetration) are respectively in Eqs. 
(3) and (4) below. 
  titijti PCBPCB ,1,,                                                                                                       (3) 
Where: tiPCB , , is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 
1, tiPCB , represents  private credit bureaus in bank i  
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term.  
  titijti InternetInternet ,1,,            (4)                                                                            
Where: tiInternet , , is the internet penetration rate of bank i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 
1, tiInternet , represents  internet penetration rate in bank i  
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error 
term.  
The procedure of instrumentation in Eq. (3) consists of regressing the information 
sharing office on their first lags. The corresponding fitted values are then saved and later used 
as the independent variable of interest in Eq. (5). The specifications are Heteroscedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. The  th quintile estimator of loan 
quantity and loan price is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem, which 
is disclosed without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (5) 
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where,  1,0 .  
As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For example, the 10
th
 or 
25
th
 quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) are examined by approximately weighing the 
residuals. The conditional quintile of financial access or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                                                                                      (6) 
where, unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile.  
This formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are 
investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of loan quantity and price. 
For the model in Eq. (6), the dependent variable iy  is  either loan quantity or loan price 
whereas ix  contains a constant term, public credit registries, private credit bureaus, ICT, 
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GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small 
banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
Table 1 and Table 2 present GMM results related to loan price and loan quantity respectively.  
Each table has eight specifications, consisting of four specifications pertaining respectively to 
public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Each of the set of four specifications has 
two sub-sets of specifications pertaining respectively to mobile phone and internet 
penetrations. Each of the ICT-related specification embodies two more sub-specifications 
reflecting a full sample and a partial sample.  
The full sample is from 2001-2011 while the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two main 
reasons motivate the choice of a partial sample. It enables the study to limit concerns about 
over-identification or instrument proliferation because T is reduced from 11 to 7.  Moreover, 
the data on information sharing offices in most countries is only available from the year 2005.  
We employ four principal information criteria to assess the validity of the GMM 
model with forward orthogonal deviations.
3
 Based on the information criteria, the following 
findings can be established. From the third specification of Table 1, we see that the net effect 
from the interaction between public credit registries and mobile phones is 0.0019 (([-0.00003 
× 34.107] + 0.003), when the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, the 
unconditional effect of public credit registries equals 0.003, while the corresponding 
unconditional impact of it is seen to be -0.00003. We thus find that there is a negative 
marginal effect and a positive net effect, for the role of mobile phones in public credit 
registries, for financial access in the perspective of loan prices. 
In Table 2, we find that there is a positive net effect from the interaction between private 
credit bureaus and mobile phones (of 0.0006).  We find that the significant control variables 
in Tables 1 and 2, have the expected signs as hypothesised in Section 3.1.  
 
                                                          
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions 
that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not 
robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than 
the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity 
of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test 
for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9) 
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Table 1: Price Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
         
 Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  -0.006 0.143 -0.001 -0.094* 0.0008 0.164*** -0.016* 0.021 
 (0.576) (0.149) (0.848) (0.068) (0.927) (0.000) (0.058) (0.614) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.686*** 0.803*** 0.640*** 0.781*** 0.653*** 0.838*** 0.690*** 0.853*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones 0.00002 0.0001** --- --- 0.00003 -0.00008 --- --- 
 (0.706) (0.048)   (0.663) (0.343)   
Internet  --- --- 0.0001 -0.0002 --- --- 0.0008*** 0.0001 
   (0.373) (0.283)   (0.000) (0.313) 
PCR  -0.002** 0.003*** -0.001** -0.0003 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.022) (0.503)     
PCB  --- --- --- --- 0.0005*** 0.00003 0.0002*** 0.00005 
     (0.000) (0.851) (0.006) (0.510) 
PCR*Mobile Phones 0.00001** -0.00003*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.024) (0.001)       
PCB*Mobile Phones --- --- --- --- -0.000005*** 0.0000006 --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.730)   
PCR*Internet --- --- 0.00002* 0.000002 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.087) (0.878)     
PCB*Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- -
0.00001*** 
-0.000001 
       (0.009) (0.799) 
GDPpcg 0.0007** -0.0003 0.0007* -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.032) (0.478) (0.055) (0.804) (0.275) (0.730) (0.657) (0.331) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0004 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.130) (0.000) (0.001) 
Pop. density 0.00002** 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00004*** 0.00001 0.00004*** 0.0000007 
 (0.041) (0.148) (0.100) (0.400) (0.002) (0.333) (0.001) (0.430) 
Deposit/Assets 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.050** 0.046*** 0.014 0.045*** 0.035** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.427) (0.000) (0.036) 
Bank Branches -0.00002 -0.0007** -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007*** -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.0004 
 (0.923) (0.010) (0.347) (0.573) (0.002) (0.371) (0.000) (0.168) 
Net effect of the Mobile  nsa 0.0019 --- --- nsa Na --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- nsa na --- --- nsa na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) (0.296) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.221) 
AR(2) (0.811) (0.189) (0.803) (0.433) (0.850) (0.693) (0.847) (0.355) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.671) (0.238) (0.918) (0.000) (0.407) (0.000) (0.205) 
Hansen OIR (0.006) (0.309) (0.072) (0.541) (0.003) (0.057) (0.041) (0.069) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.003) (0.090) (0.038) (0.767) (0.010) (0.296) (0.020) (0.958) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.159) (0.647) (0.295) (0.345) (0.032) (0.053) (0.253) (0.012) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.072) (0.181) (0.148) (0.501) (0.085) (0.012) (0.033) (0.038) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.008) (0.734) (0.110) (0.506) (0.002) (0.954) (0.325) (0.540) 
         
Fisher  70.20*** 105.40*** 71.88*** 61.99*** 48.89 *** 109.18*** 41.94*** 83.38*** 
Instruments  42 41 42 41 42 40 42 40 
Banks 144 112 144 111 144 109 144 108 
Observations  698 140 679 139 690 138 671 137 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal 
effects. nsa: not specifically applicable because the information criteria does not valid the model.  
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Table 2: Quantity Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
         
 Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  0.306*** 0.089 0.118** -0.255 0.264*** 0.004 0.210*** 0.150 
 (0.000) (0.575) (0.042) (0.125) (0.000) (0.954) (0.000) (0.117) 
Quantity of Loans (-1) 0.934*** 1.009*** 0.962*** 0.995*** 0.935*** 0.997*** 0.951*** 0.994*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones -0.002*** -0.0006 --- --- -0.002*** 0.00004 --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.108)   (0.000) (0.899)   
Internet  --- --- -0.002** 0.001 --- --- -0.003** 0.001 
   (0.026) (0.186)   (0.012) (0.166) 
PCR  0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.005* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.474) (0.782) (0.207) (0.054)     
PCB  --- --- --- --- 0.0004 0.001** -0.0003 0.0005 
     (0.632) (0.026) (0.548) (0.213) 
PCR*Mobile Phones -0.00004 0.00002 --- --- 0.000004 --- --- --- 
 (0.481) (0.736)   (0.544)    
PCB*Mobile Phones --- --- --- --- --- -0.00001** --- --- 
      (0.017)   
PCR*Internet --- --- -0.0001 -0.0001 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.107) (0.124)     
PCB*Internet --- --- ---- --- --- --- 0.00001 -0.00006** 
       (0.515) (0.044) 
GDPpcg 0.004** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.042** 0.005*** 
 (0.026) (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.001) (0.185) (0.015) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.0003 -0.001* 0.001 0.00003 0.001** 0.0006 0.001* -0.0003 
 (0.708) (0.058) (0.226) (0.970) (0.026) (0.546) (0.089) (0.637) 
Pop. density -0.0002** 0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00005 -0.0001** 0.00001 -0.00006 -0.00003 
 (0.013) (0.826) (0.678) (0.468) (0.016) (0.719) (0.304) (0.447) 
Deposit/Assets 0.023 0.039 0.124 0.177** 0.059 0.136 0.090 0.119 
 (0.803) (0.713) (0.157) (0.042) (0.471) (0.178) (0.223) (0.102) 
Bank Branches 0.005** -0.002 0.001 -0.005*** 0.003* -0.002** 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.251) (0.294) (0.000) (0.073) (0.060) (0.666) (0.006) 
Net effect of the Mobile  na Na --- --- na 0.0006 --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) (0.919) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.877) 
AR(2) (0.754) (0.894) (0.694) (0.951) (0.734) (0.806) (0.737) (0.247) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.015) 
Hansen OIR (0.038) (0.434) (0.001) (0.627) (0.041) (0.288) (0.017) (0.637) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.611) (0.302) (0.742) (0.262) (0.286) (0.514) (0.433) (0.481) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.013) (0.523) (0.000) (0.793) (0.036) (0.220) (0.008) (0.630) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.038) (0.525) (0.005) (0.609) (0.023) (0.337) (0.018) (0.657) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.258) (0.233) (0.055) (0.489) (0.455) (0.238) (0.217) (0.412) 
         
Fisher  761.21*** 1665.19*** 1553.32*** 3038.86*** 896.39*** 3991.86*** 885.73*** 2475.98*** 
Instruments  42 39 42 41 42 37 42 39 
Banks 145 115 145 113 145 112 145 110 
Observations  735 145 713 143 728 144 706 142 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal 
effects.  
 
 
Tables 3-6 present QR related findings. In particular, Tables 3-4 are related nexuses 
between ICT and public credit registries, and Table 5-6 focus on relationships between ICT 
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and private credit bureaus. For each information sharing office, one table focuses on loan 
price (Table 3 and Table 5) while the other is on loan quantity (Table 4 and Table 6).  
See Tables 1-2, for the findings in terms of marginal and net effects; for the purpose of 
the computation of net effects, mean values are based on instrumented ICT values, notably: 
37.019 is the instrumented mean value of mobile phone penetration whereas 7.809 is the 
instrumented mean value of internet penetration. For all tables: (i) the consistent differences 
in estimated coefficients in OLS versus quintiles (with respect to sign, significance and 
magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of the QR empirical strategy and (ii) ‘mobile 
phone’-related regressions are disclosed on the left-hand-side whereas internet-oriented 
estimations are presented on the right-hand-side.   
 The following findings can be established from Table 3 on price effects of public 
credit registries with ICT: The net effect from the interaction between public credit registries 
and mobile phones is negative in bottom quintiles; while the net effect from the interaction 
between public credit registries and internet is positive from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quintiles. 
In Table 4 on loan effects from public credit registries with ICT, the net effect from the 
interaction between public credit registries and the mobile phone is positive in the 0.25
th
 
quintile whereas the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and the 
internet is positive in the 0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
 quintiles.  
In Table 5, private credit bureaus with the internet have a positive net effect on loan prices in 
the 0.75
th
 quintile. In Table 6, private credit bureaus with the internet (mobile phone) have a 
negative net effect on loan quantity in the 0.50
th
 quintile (from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.75
th
 
quintiles).  The corresponding positive marginal effects from the interaction with mobile 
phones is an indication that positive net effect from mobile phones can be reached  if certain 
thresholds of mobile phones are attained. Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
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Table 3: Price Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  -0.084*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.084*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0001* -0.0004*** -0.0001** -0.00004 -0.00008 -0.00006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.091) (0.000) (0.018) (0.590) (0.354) (0.603)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0004* -0.0006** -0.001*** -0.001** 
       (0.008) (0.174) (0.084) (0.025) (0.000) (0.019) 
PCR (IV) -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.083) (0.295) (0.293) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.180) 
PCR(IV)*Mobile Phones(IV) 0.00001 0.00002* 0.00002*** 0.000009 0.000002 0.000004 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.241) (0.082) (0.006) (0.475) (0.868) (0.835)       
PCR(IV)*Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00005** 0.00002 0.00005** 0.00006** 0.00007** 0.00003 
       (0.026) (0.483) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031) (0.583) 
GDPpcg -0.0008** -0.0009 -0.00001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.001** -0.0006 0.0001 -0.00002 -0.0004 -0.001** -0.0009 
 (0.046) (0.105) (0.975) (0.247) (0.233) (0.046) (0.114) (0.869) (0.956) (0.303) (0.011) (0.153) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.837) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00006*** 0.00004 0.00006*** 0.00008*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00007*** 0.00007 0.00007*** 0.00009*** 0.0001*** 0.00006*** 
 (0.001) (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Deposit/Assets 0.017** 0.007 0.017*** 0.020** 0.017* 0.036*** 0.015** 0.007 0.015** 0.006 0.021*** 0.042*** 
 (0.019) (0.503) (0.004) (0.012) (0.050) (0.008) (0.033) (0.569) (0.035) (0.407) (0.005) (0.001) 
Bank Branches -0.0005 0.001** -0.0007** -0.001*** -0.0009** -0.0001 -0.00005 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0009* 0.0003 
 (0.120) (0.022) (0.017) (0.008) (0.032) (0.734) (0.914) (0.158) (0.142) (0.459) (0.096) (0.740) 
Small Banks  0.008** 0.012** 0.011*** 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.007* 0.015** 0.008* 0.003 0.003 0.009 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.001) (0.717) (0.605) (0.233) (0.072) (0.046) (0.058) (0.537) (0.506) (0.173) 
Domestic Banks 0.001 -0.010** -0.002 0.007** 0.008** 0.001 0.001 -0.014** -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.002 
 (0.560) (0.026) (0.362) (0.041) (0.046) (0.852) (0.700) (0.022) (0.759) (0.118) (0.192) (0.635) 
Islamic Banks  -0.017*** -0.003 -0.016** -0.015* -0.014 -0.013 -0.012* 0.009 -0.013 -0.012 0.004 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.791) (0.016) (0.093) (0.175) (0.347) (0.091) (0.570) (0.160) (0.248) (0.661) (0.946) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile  na -0.0032 -0.0022 na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0026 na -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0034 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.216 0.116 0.150 0.158 0.149 0.136 0.222 0.093 0.151 0.169 0.173 0.142 
Fisher  21.67***      22.71***      
Observations  728 728 728 728 728 728 700 700 700 700 700 700 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Table 4: Quantity Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  3.806*** 2.762*** 2.982*** 3.361*** 4.596*** 4.943*** 3.920*** 2.752*** 2.970*** 3.495*** 4.492*** 5.400*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.003* 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.088) (0.012) (0.337) (0.288) (0.011) (0.002)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.030** 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.021*** 
       (0.000) (0.0006) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PCR (IV) 0.066** 0.104*** 0.064 0.080 -0.016 -0.049 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.081* 0.101** 0.012 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.001) (0.300) (0.222) (0.719) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.016) (0.637) (0.734) 
PCR(IV)*Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0005** -0.0008*** -0.0003 -0.0006 0.00009 0.0004 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.045) (0.006) (0.615) (0.302) (0.836) (0.220)       
PCR(IV)*Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002** -0.0001 0.0002 
       (0.003) (0.000) (0.125) (0.033) (0.821) (0.606) 
GDPpcg -0.014 0.020** -0.019 -0.031 0.002 -0.014 -0.018 0.020** -0.031* -0.031 -0.008 -0.027 
 (0.221) (0.048) (0.317) (0.191) (0.856) (0.129) (0.118) (0.032) (0.083) (0.174) (0.574) (0.027) 
Inflation  -0.024*** -0.004 -0.010 -0.031** -0.025*** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.008 -0.010 -0.028* -0.022*** -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.329) (0.329) (0.025) (0.005) (0.637) (0.001) (0.160) (0.344) (0.058) (0.006) (0.309) 
Pop. density -0.001*** -0.0007** -0.001** -0.0007 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0009 -0.001*** -0.0009* 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.024) (0.386) (0.050) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.001) (0.065) 
Deposit/Assets 1.867*** 1.057*** 2.034*** 2.544*** 1.306*** 1.279*** 1.741*** 1.217*** 2.063*** 2.432*** 1.173*** 1.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.072*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.100*** -0.056*** -0.075*** -0.140*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  -0.775*** -1.190*** -1.268*** -0.715*** -0.326** -0.250** -0.820*** -1.010*** -1.171*** -0.872*** -0.457*** -0.418*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Domestic Banks 0.401*** 0.078 0.408** 0.460** 0.440*** 0.436*** 0.451*** 0.117 0.447*** 0.523*** 0.606*** 0.600*** 
 (0.000) (0.378) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.253) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.587*** 0.322** -0.085 -0.287 -1.193*** -1.340*** -0.546*** 0.081 0.104 -0.357 -0.982*** -1.205*** 
 (0.000) (0.031) (0.822) (0.481) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.726) (0.815) (0.487) (0.003) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile  0.0474 0.0743 na na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0593 0.0723 na 0.0853 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.198 0.085 0.115 0.152 0.111 0.126 0.206 0.089 0.125 0.150 0.111 0.117 
Fisher  31.37***      27.13***      
Observations  751 751 751 751 751 751 719 719 719 719 719 719 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Table 5: Price Effects of Private Credit  Bureaus  with ICT (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Price of Loans 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.080*** 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.069*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.355)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0005** 0.00006 0.00001 
       (0.247) (0.329) (0.127) (0.035) (0.865) (0.976) 
PCB (IV) 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0006* 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.0006** 0.0009*** 
 (0.007) (0.540) (0.678) (0.017) (0.081) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.010) (0.006) 
PCB(IV)*Mobile Phones(IV) -0.000001 0.000006 0.0000007* -0.0000004 -0.000001 -0.000005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.684) (0.142) (0.094) (0.894) (0.670) (0.209)       
PCB(IV)*Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.00003*** -0.000004 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00004* -0.00004 
       (0.000) (0.700) (0.186) (0.174) (0.071) (0.120) 
GDPpcg -0.0009** -0.001** -0.0007 -0.001** 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0004 0.00005 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 
 (0.038) (0.012) (0.284) (0.024) (0.405) (0.316) (0.316) (0.936) (0.851) (0.535) (0.734) (0.264) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.620) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00004*** 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004*** 0.00005*** 0.00007*** 0.00005*** 0.00005** 0.00004** 0.00005*** 0.00006*** 0.00007*** 
 (0.000) (0.103) (0.189) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposit/Assets 0.022*** 0.008 0.014 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.020*** -0.001 0.017 0.016** 0.021** 0.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.347) (0.209) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.872) (0.148) (0.017) (0.020) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004 -0.0009*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.308) (0.008) (0.029) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.018) 
Small Banks  0.009** 0.012** 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.318) (0.512) (0.462) (0.114) (0.198) (0.149) (0.750) (0.633) (0.288) (0.337) 
Domestic Banks -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.0035 0.003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.012*** -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.0006 
 (0.736) (0.261) (0.552) (0.325) (0.408) (0.947) (0.699) (0.009) (0.609) (0.237) (0.506) (0.913) 
Islamic Banks  -0.021* -0.001 -0.012 -0.014* -0.005 -0.013 -0.008 0.015 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.058) (0.880) (0.305) (0.093) (0.603) (0.243) (0.139) (0.216) (0.826) (0.260) (0.321) (0.306) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile  na Na na na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0006 na na na 0.0002 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.245 0.155 0.181 0.171 0.156 0.140 0.232 0.136 0.160 0.167 0.155 0.135 
Fisher  23.83***      21.73***      
Observations  729 729 729 729 729 729 701 701 701 701 701 701 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Table  6: Quantity Effects of Private Credit  Bureaus  with ICT (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  3.829*** 2.386*** 3.271*** 3.345*** 4.624*** 4.862*** 3.787*** 2.277*** 2.888*** 3.489*** 4.771*** 5.156*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.002 0.003** -0.001 0.007*** 0.004* 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.354) (0.030) (0.745) (0.003) (0.088) (0.000)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.047*** 0.018** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 
       (0.000) (0.048) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
PCB (IV) -0.024*** -0.008* -0.027** -0.029*** -0.056*** -0.008 -0.006 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.017** 0.0006 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.096) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.150) (0.303) (0.856) (0.984) (0.029) (0.879) (0.197) 
PCB(IV)*Mobile Phones(IV) 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0006*** 0.00009 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.008) (0.036) (0.011) (0.039) (0.000) (0.140)       
PCB(IV)*Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001* 0.0005 0.0002 0.001** 0.0005* 0.000004 
       (0.061) (0.253) (0.759) (0.018) (0.078) (0.987) 
GDPpcg -0.004 0.014* -0.013 -0.008 0.001 -0.013* -0.0002 0.008 -0.038* -0.015 0.008 -0.018* 
 (0.172) (0.087) (0.431) (0.565) (0.940) (0.061) (0.983) (0.349) (0.051) (0.386) (0.468) (0.096) 
Inflation  -0.022*** -0.010** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.001 -0.015** -0.009* -0.017 -0.020* -0.017*** 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.228) (0.000) (0.003) (0.761) (0.022) (0.095) (0.104) (0.068) (0.005) (0.392) 
Pop. density -0.0009*** -0.0002* -0.002 -0.0009** -0.001*** -0.0007** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.00002 -0.0005 -0.001*** -0.0009** 
 (0.002) (0.096) (0.583) (0.039) (0.005) (0.028) (0.009) (0.001) (0.964) (0.370) (0.005) (0.048) 
Deposit/Assets 1.883*** 0.949*** 1.160*** 2.525*** 1.482*** 1.327*** 1.789*** 1.157*** 2.240*** 2.314*** 1.266*** 1.162*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0..000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.050*** -0.010* -0.026** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.106*** -0.022** -0.098*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.073) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  -0.830*** -0.824*** -1.318*** -0.819*** -0.400*** -0.216** -0.920*** -0.689*** -1.388*** -0.759*** -0.656*** -0.508*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.392*** 0.085 0.407*** 0.517*** 0.465*** 0.404*** 0.415*** 0.035 0.524*** 0.485*** 0.622*** 0.556*** 
 (0.000) (0.239) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.698) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.544*** 0.434*** 0.085 -0.388 -1.172*** -1.294*** -0.350 0.389* -0.060 -0.043 -0.659** -0.940*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.796) (0.121) (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.079) (0.900) (0.913) (0.013) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile  -0.0165 -0.0042 -0.0158 -0.0215 -0.0337 na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- na na na -0.0091 na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.204 0.085 0.113 0.160 0.124 0.131 0.226 0.083 0.122 0.164 0.132 0.137 
Fisher  34.85***      30.37***      
Observations  754 754 754 754 754 754 722 722 722 722 722 722 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.
20 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 This section reconciles the relationship of the findings with existing literature and 
further explores the implications of the findings in terms of how unexpected results can be 
leveraged for enhanced financial access. From the findings it is apparent that the relationship 
between ICT and public credit registries leads to increased financial access, compared to the 
nexus between ICT and private credit bureaus. Our findings are not directly comparable with 
the engaged studies in the introduction which have directly examined the relationship between 
information sharing offices and financial access. Our assessment of the nexus between 
information sharing offices and access to finance is not direct because the relationship is 
contingent on the role of ICT. Nonetheless, we take a minimalist approach by assuming that 
ICT also indirectly influenced the role of information sharing offices in financial access, 
established in previous studies.   
 From a broad perspective, the findings are not consistent with Singh et al. (2009) who 
have established that African nations which have information sharing offices enjoy 
comparatively higher degrees of financial access. The results are consistent with Galindo and 
Miller (2001) from the view that nations with better developed credit registries are associated 
with less financial constraints, compared to countries with less developed information sharing 
offices. This narrative is consistent with this study because from our sample, public credit 
registries are more developed compared to private credit bureaus. The perspective is 
substantiated by Appendix 5 which shows that compared to public credit registries, private 
credit bureaus are less apparent in many countries.  
 Conversely, our findings do not align with Love and Mylenko (2003) who have 
established that private credit bureaus are associated with more financial access when 
compared with public credit registries.  Our findings are also not consistent with Triki and 
Gajigo (2014) who have concluded that countries with private credit bureaus enjoy higher 
levels of financial access relative to countries with public credit registries or neither 
institution.  
 It is also important to explore how the unexpected findings from private credit bureaus 
can be leveraged to enhance financial access. Accordingly, we have seen from the Quantile 
Regressions findings that private credit bureaus increase (resp. decrease) loan price (resp. 
quantity). Fortunately, corresponding marginal effects are negative (resp. positive). This 
implies that at certain thresholds of ICT, the unconditional positive (resp. negative) effect 
from private credit bureaus on loan prices (resp. quantity) can be changed to negative (resp. 
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positive). Hence the price effect of private credit bureaus with internet penetration in the 
0.75
th
 of Table 5 can become negative if internet penetration reaches a threshold of 15 
(0.0006/0.00004) per 100 people. This internet threshold makes economic sense because it is 
within the range (minimum to maximum) of internet penetration provided by the summary 
statistics (0.037 to 51.000).  
 In the light of the above, in Table 6, the positive marginal effects from the interaction 
between mobile phones and private credit bureaus can convert the unconditional negative 
effects of private credit bureaus on the quantity of loans into overall positive effects on the 
quantity of loans. Hence, mobile phone penetration thresholds of 80 (0.008/0.0001), 90 
(0.027/0.0003), 145 (0.029/0.0002), 93.33(0.056/0.0006) per 100 people are needed 
respectively in the 0.10
th
, 0.25
th
, 0.50
th
 and 0.75
th
 quintiles to convert the unconditional 
negative effects into overall positive effects. The thresholds also make economic sense 
because they are within the range of mobile phone penetration disclosed by the summary 
statistics (0.000 to 147.202).  
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions  
 This study has investigated loan price and quantity effects of information sharing 
offices with ICT in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 
2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and 
Instrumental Quantile Regressions. The findings broadly show that ICT with public credit 
registries decrease the price of loans and increase the quantity of loans.  While the net effects 
from the interaction of ICT with private credit bureaus do not lead to enhanced financial 
access, corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement private credit bureaus 
to increase loan quantity and decrease loan prices when certain thresholds of ICT are attained. 
These thresholds have been computed and discussed.  
 Future studies can improve extant literature by assessing if the established linkages 
withstand further scrutiny when investigated within comparative economic framework, 
notably, in terms of bank: ownership (foreign vs. domestic), size (large vs. small) and 
‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs  
  
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
 
 
Appendix 2: Definitions of  Variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of Variables Sources 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Internet Penetration   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Loan Quantity   Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, 
Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
ICT Mobile 34.107 32.409 0.000 147.202 1776 
       
 Internet 7.268 8.738 0.037 51.000 1757 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
Information  Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
sharing  Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size : 684) 
                  
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls ICT Info. Sharing  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Mobile Internet PCR PCB  
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.261 -0.122 0.019 -0.163 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.315 -0.238 -0.205 -0.178 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.056 0.335 0.546 -0.233 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.087 -0.036 -0.038 -0.083 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.610 0.747 0.602 0.139 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.206 -0.219 -0.342 0.094 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 -0.118 -0.096 0.007 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 0.146 0.089 -0.084 0.080 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 -0.146 -0.089 0.084 -0.080 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.151 0.039 0.010 0.187 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.151 0.039 -0.010 -0.187 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.045 -0.039 -0.014 -0.071 Islam 
            1.000 0.045 -0.032 0.014 0.071 NonIsl. 
             1.000 0.634 0.304 0.519 Mobile 
              1.000 0.513 -0.010 Internet 
               1.000 -0.151 PCR 
                1000 PCB 
                  
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small 
banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and 
Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. Internet: internet penetration.   
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Appendix 5: Country-specific average values from information sharing offices  
   
 Public Credit Registries  Private Credit Bureaus 
   
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 
9) Central African Republic  1.412 0.000 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 
14) Côte d’Ivoire  2.487 0.000 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 
19) Ethiopia  0.087 0.000 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 
28) Libya na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 
33) Mauritius  27.866 0.000 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 
44) Somalia na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 
49) Togo 2.550 0.000 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 
   
na: not applicable because of missing observations.  
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